Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia

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Highly informative - Rashid writes from the perspective of an urbane, educated Pakistani and utilizes his network of contacts throughout Central As... (show more)

Highly informative - Rashid writes from the perspective of an urbane, educated Pakistani and utilizes his network of contacts throughout Central Asia to provide unique insight into the dynamics of the region since September 11th. Where he flounders is in a conspicuous pulling of punches against Hamid Karzai - a personal friend - and in espousing as fact some of the more virulent screeds from the extreme American left against the Bush administration and ephemeral 'neocons.' This is in contrast to the rest of Rashid's reasoned analysis.

Particularly damning is his indictment of NATO and a majority of European nations for their lack of commitment to protecting and rebuilding Afghanistan. Rashid highlights the absurdity of a NATO military force assembled and specifically prohibited from engaging in combat. While noting the contributions of the British, Canadians, and Poles in some of Afghanistan's most violent areas, he lambastes other nations - France and Germany in particular - for their negligence. Rashid notes that, compared to their size, a remarkably small percentage of European armies are deployed to Afghanistan, and that the overall defense budgets of European nations have seen no change since September 11th. He blames this on the pronounced failure of European leaders to convince their populations that the conflict in Afghanistan-Pakistan directly affects their own security. This is a criticism one can also level at the Bush administration, which was famously unable to articulate the existential threat posed by Islamist extremism. The Obama administration has yet to do so either, despite their ostensible increased focus on Afghanistan. (show less)

 

 

by Facebook-användare

No, it's a flop!

I had two main reactions to Rashid's book. One was frustration and the other was appreciation. My frustration extended largely from his liberal vi... (show more)

I had two main reactions to Rashid's book. One was frustration and the other was appreciation. My frustration extended largely from his liberal viewpoint that the war on Afghanistan was a just war and could've gone swimmingly "if only" the various players had made the correct decisions and taken the appropriate actions. His main argument appeared to be that occupation (though he argued that it wasn't) and nation-building can be done successfully "if only" everyone is up front, genuine and on the level. This strikes me as a painfully naïve way of interpreting world events and prescribing solutions. Just as he tried to contextualize Afghanistan with other countries in Central Asia, the U.S. invasion and occupation needs to be contextualized within a discussion of hegemony and capitalism. After the scores of countries the U.S. has invaded, I'm shocked people still think the U.S. actually cares about the Afghan, Iraqi, Guatemalan, Filipino etc., etc. people, and that the "if only" argument is still used.

My other frustration was that there was much that seemed to be missing from the book. There was not much of a discussion of the Taliban or Al-Qaeda, what they thought, how they formed, why they were bad. It was just assumed that they were bad and needed no discussion. I think labeling something as bad and worthy of being opposed without much discussion is dangerous, even if the label is appropriate. I was also troubled by his other labeling of things. He doesn't discuss what jihad means, but again it's taken to be bad. He claims "talib" means "religious student" and "madrassa" means "religious school" when both just mean student and school. He doesn't explain his definition of Islamic "extremism" or "fundamentalism". Finally, in the first three chapters (I stopped after that) I counted 16 claims that I felt warranted footnotes where none existed. It all seemed very attuned to inaccurate Western conceptions and instead of using his book as an opportunity to deconstruct them, he reinforces them, which is unfortunate.

However, I'm still glad that I read the book. I learned much about the area and it is certainly extremely topical. Now hearing about how the Taliban is operating in the Swat Valley makes a lot more sense. It also provoked some thinking about, well, what is the solution, what should be done. I think it goes back to the first readings for class on Hizbullah and Israel. From my perspective, I oppose the US/European occupation, I think Karzai's an inept puppet, I certainly am not a fan of the Taliban or warlords. I know nothing about Afghanistan's civil society. Do I even know enough to have an opinion? It got me thinking and I appreciate that. (show less)

 

 

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  I'm torn - Rashid's book is at once a searing, distorted polemic and an indispensable guide to Afghanistan's and Pakistan's near-simultaneous "Descent into Chaos" - for once, a sensational-sounding title on which the following text actually delivers. The polemic force-fits everything that's happened in Central and South Asia over the last eight years into the view that this is all a direct result of monstrous wrongs committed by the United States and its Defense Department and int... (show more)

  I'm torn - Rashid's book is at once a searing, distorted polemic and an indispensable guide to Afghanistan's and Pakistan's near-simultaneous "Descent into Chaos" - for once, a sensational-sounding title on which the following text actually delivers. The polemic force-fits everything that's happened in Central and South Asia over the last eight years into the view that this is all a direct result of monstrous wrongs committed by the United States and its Defense Department and intelligence community operators - e.g., without explicitly stating as much, Rashid characterizes CIA as a near perfect analogue of Pakistan's ISI in terms of dark, maliciously conceived, stupidly executed intent - a contention that will draw cries of agreement from many quarters but frequently relieves the locals of their portion of culpability. There's a curious, YES, Karzai failed to build parties, BUT the Americans didn't insist that he do so, and thus the blame falls properly on them.

  On the other hand, the post-9/11 descent of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is told in thematic chapters - e.g., drugs, warlords, security, nation-building, Musharraf's failures, Karzai's failures - is in effect a sequel to Steve Coll's masterful Ghost Wars and tells a tale of almost unremitting mistakes, perfidy, venality, stupidity, and ultimately woe to the people of the region - much of which Rashid reported on or experienced first hand. But even as Rashid acknowledges periodically the difficulty of national building and its failures in places like East Timor, despite massive international intervention and funding, he believes that, "If only the United States had done what I in hindsight thought it should have, a miracle would have occurred in this rocky land where no seed but violence seems to find purchase." Rashid is particularly harsh on Pakistan, its military intelligence agency, ISI, and former President and Army Chief Pervez Musharraf for playing a double game (and, to read the headlines, the double game remains on) of agreeing with the United States that counterterrorism is the highest of priorities while continuing to funnel large amounts of aid and providing safe harbor to the Afghan Talibans, a "strategic asset" in the reportedly intercepted words of current Pakistani Army chief, the US-trained Ashraf Kiyani.

  By all means read this passionate book by a man who is among the bravest of all the world's heroically brave journalists, but DON'T suspend your judgment: keep those critical antennae up. (show less)

   

   

  by Paul Frandano on Sep 05, 2009 at 03:07PM

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  This book chronicles the debacle that has been our experience in Central Asia for the last decade and more. It is subtle, nuanced, and fascinating reading, but it becomes difficult and painful reading in two chapters: American Leads the Way: Disappearances and Renditions, and Drugs and Thugs. How many generations will it take for us to once again be relied on as the force for good, the protector of the innocent -- or to just stop being the keeper of the disappeared? What an ugly ugly pict... (show more)

  This book chronicles the debacle that has been our experience in Central Asia for the last decade and more. It is subtle, nuanced, and fascinating reading, but it becomes difficult and painful reading in two chapters: American Leads the Way: Disappearances and Renditions, and Drugs and Thugs. How many generations will it take for us to once again be relied on as the force for good, the protector of the innocent -- or to just stop being the keeper of the disappeared? What an ugly ugly picture it is. And how fragile is this part of the world! And what a network of "friends" did we find to help us hide the disappeared and the rendered! What would Mom have told us about the people we are hanging out with? Mom knows better -- and so, I hope, do we. In a global world, violence and chaos anywhere can spill into our homes and lives. We need a wise policy. Being the bully boy doesn't work. It is likely beyond our capacity to "Americanize" the world, but we need policies in line with the values that we affirm for ourselves. (show less)

   

  by Facebook-användare on Jul 18, 2009 at 04:49PM

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